ABSTRACT With the development of quantum wireless networks, the practical application of quantum private query (QPQ) should conform to the features of quantum wireless networks to achieve any-to-any query, and QPQ requires a new query mechanism. We first propose a scheme for a network private query in a quantum wireless network with multiple third parties, in which any user can query any database with the assistance of the third parties, by measuring each of the distant nodes that initially share entanglement with each other. The required entanglement among these nodes is established by the third-party intermediate node equipped with GHZ generator using multi-qubit GHZ states. A bilayer network topology, as well as the corresponding private query protocol, ensures the rapid and secure private query. Under the protection of the multi-qubit GHZ state's quantum correlation, the privacy of Alice and Bob is protected from the third parties' fake entangled attack and external attack, and they cannot obtain the privacy of each other by taking quantum memory attack. The performance parameters of the proposed scheme are described based on the analysis of classical wireless communication cost and communication delay.
I. INTRODUCTION
In a type of applications, the two authorized parties not only expect their information to be protected from external attackers, but also their respective privacy against each other. This type of problem is formalized as symmetrically private information retrieval (SPIR) by Gertner et al. [1] , where the privacy of the user, as well as the security of the database, is guaranteed. Quantum private query (QPQ) falls into this category, which also protects database security while protecting user privacy. That is, the user, Alice, wants to retrieve an entry from a database, the database holder Bob cannot obtain the information about which entry she wants. Simultaneously, Bob cannot disclose more information than what Alice wants. The SPIR with information-theoretic security is proved to be impossible [2] .
Giovannetti et al. [3] , [4] presented the first QPQ protocol (GLM protocol) in 2008. Then, the protocol was
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Marcello Caleffi. improved by Olejnik [5] (O-protocol) in 2011. Nevertheless, the above two protocols are arduous to implement because they depend on oracle operations. When a large database is concerned, the oracle dimension is very high. Besides, it is affected by channel loss attack. Accordingly, it is not practical. To solve this problem, Jakobi et al. [6] first proposed a new practical private database queries protocol based on a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol (J-protocol). In fact, the earliest QKD-based scheme is based on the Bennett-Brassard (BB84) QKD protocol [7] , but its disadvantage is that if the user performs a quantum memory attack, then the security of the database is gone. Jakobi et al. use the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin (SARG04) QKD protocol [8] instead of BB84 protocol to resist quantum memory attacks. Since then, a host of attention has been focused on QKD-based QPQ protocols, and quite a few similar protocols were proposed [9] , [10] , [12] - [35] .
Existing works on QPQ mainly research from three aspects: research on the methods of oblivious key distribution [9] , [10] , [12] - [21] , research on the classic post-processing (CPP) algorithms [20] , [22] - [24] and research on the ways to stand against channel noise [21] , [23] , [25] . In the first aspect, Gao et al. [9] and Yang et al. [10] proposed flexible QPQ protocols, which use the thoughts of B92 protocol [11] to improve J-protocol. By adjusting the value of a parameter θ , Gao et al.'s protocol exhibits better database security when θ < π 4 , while Yang et al.'s protocol can simultaneously obtain better database security and user privacy under the same conditions. Zhang et al. [12] presented a QPQ protocol based on counterfactual quantum key distribution. By adding key detection devices to QKD devices, the user privacy and database security can be kept secure. To ensure the security against the joint-measurement (JM) attack, Wei et al. [19] presented a novel QPQ protocol based on a two-way QKD scheme and Yang et al. [20] proposed a CPP algorithm. In terms of improving CPP algorithms, Rao and Jakobi [22] proposed N − N and rM − N schemes to improve CPP scheme of J-protocol, which reduce the communication complexity from O(N logN ) to O(N ). However, the aforementioned schemes still suffer the problem that there is no error-correction algorithm in post-processing, which is not really practical. Therefore, Gao et al. [23] proposed an effective error-correction method which makes such QPQ more practical. Regarding the communication efficiency and security, Yang et al. [24] presented a novel CPP scheme to reduce the communication complexity and improve the security. In terms of ways to stand against channel noise, Chan et al. [21] proposed a fault-tolerant QPQ protocol in which a novel error-correction algorithm is used to cope with noisy channels, accompanied by a proof-ofconcept demonstration of the protocol over a deployed fiber. Gao et al. [23] proposed a novel error-correction method in post-processing which also can stand against channel noise. Yang et al. [25] presented a robust QPQ protocol based on alternative sequences of single-qubit measurements which can resist channel noise.
To the best of our knowledge, all existing QPQ protocols concentrate on point-to-point private query between two remote parties. However, with the development of quantum wireless network, the practical application of QPQ should conform to the features of quantum wireless network to achieve any-to-any query. Wireless technology has supplied more flexible and inexpensive ways in the quantum communication field, QPQ requires a new query mechanism. The wireless network is integrated with quantum physics to guarantee the security of the network, named quantum wireless network. Quantum entanglement is an important characteristic of quantum physics. Based on quantum entanglement, quantum wireless network private query (QWNPQ) can be realized without transmitting qubits between the user and the database. Thus far, there is no work focused on QWNPQ. In this paper, we present a novel QWNPQ with multiple third parties scheme, in which the third-party Trent prepares and distributes the multi-qubit GHZ states to Alice, Bob and other related third-party intermediate nodes after the user Alice requests to query the database Bob in the wireless The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces bilayer network topology for QWNPQ and the proposed QWNPQ protocol. Sect. III analyzes the security of the proposed protocol. Finally, a discussion and conclusion is drawn in Sect. IV.
II. QUANTUM WIRELESS PRIVATE QUERY NETWORK A. BILAYER NETWORK TOPOLOGY FOR QWNPQ
In the bilayer network topology for QWNPQ, as is presented in Figure. 1, the spatially separated nodes are distributed on two layers: one layer is quantum backbone routers(QBRs) and the other layer is the terminals under the QBRs. The QBRs can store-and-forward information and function as quantum relays for some time; the terminals under their coverage are distributed mobile quantum devices with both quantum and wireless communication capabilities. The home location register (HLR) is responsible for recording the current location of terminals. The node equipped with the GHZ generator in the core network is responsible for generating the GHZ states and distributing the particles to corresponding nodes through quantum wired channels. Based on this flexible network topology, the quantum wireless channels (QWCs) are established only when necessary, thus the resource consumption can be largely reduced.
B. QWNPQ PROTOCOL
We start by describing the protocol that Alice and Bob (Bob') in Figure. 1 must follow. Suppose that any user Alice intends VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. QWNPQ protocol with multiple third parties.
to query any database Bob(Bob') in a distance of the network, but she doesn't know his location or if they are within the same QBR's coverage. The entire process of the protocol is shown in Figure. Alice broadcasts a route request (RREQ) to her neighbor nodes and the RREQ eventually arrives at Bob(Bob') by the forwarding of a few intermediate nodes via classical wireless channels (CWCs).
To search an appropriate path from Alice to Bob(Bob') with small routing overheads, an on-demand routing protocol [36] is initiated. 3) After the routing path is determined, Bob(Bob') sends a route reply (RREP) along the inverse path backward to the source node Alice. Meanwhile, Bob(Bob') will send to Trent a message that indicates the location of all nodes on the path. 4) According to the location of the database, Trent prepares multi-qubit GHZ states. 
Trent can then use these associated measurement results to eavesdrop private information from Bob's database. As an example, Trent pretends to be Alice to send Bob the fake s , and makes him to use it to move his own measurement results, encrypt database X N , and send E N . At this time, Trent can decrypt E N through his own measurement result to obtain the private information of the database. When Trent launches such an attack, the prepared quantum state is a dichotomic n-party entangled state, which is not a real n-party one. Therefore, decoy-state security check can be used to detect the quantum states shared by Alice, Bob and the third parties for resisting the fake entangled attack initiated by Trent. This technique is enlightened by BB84 QKD protocol, which has been proved to be unconditionally secure [7] . In this way, Trent cannot get Bob's privacy. For Alice's privacy, Trent cannot get it either, because he does not know s that Alice secretly sends to Bob.
2) THE OTHER THIRD-PARTY INTERMEDIATE NODES' ATTACK
Since they do not prepare and distribute quantum states, the attack mode of these intermediate nodes is different from Trent. Under a semi-trusted model, they simply record and announce their own measurement bases and results to assist in the successful completion of the query. Their cheating by announcing error measurement bases and results cannot bring them any benefit. Alice may get a wrong answer which will be found at a later time. Under a malicious model, they may conduct a Denial of Service attack in which one or more malignant parties simply wish to prevent message distribution, or simply the defective nodes that operate in good faith but incur failures beyond their control. If no bit survives at Alice's end finally, the protocol fails. Alice can request Trent to handle this issue and re-execute the protocol.
B. EXTERNAL ATTACK
In the stage of the GHZ state preparation and distribution, the external attack has no meaning because the GHZ particles at this point have not carried any privacy about Alice and Bob. Once the entanglement is securely distributed, external eavesdropper cannot reconstruct the unknown quantum information. Therefore, the security of quantum wired channels concerns the secure distribution of entangled particles. To resist the external attack on the channels, in step 5) we use decoy-state security check between the generator and the receiver. So the security against external attack is guaranteed.
C. INSIDE PARTICIPANT ATTACK
Since all the involved nodes randomly choose the X basis or Y basis to measure the particles in their hands, Alice can perform quantum memory attack. When Alice launches this attack, she does not directly measure the particles in her hands, but waits until Bob announces the measurement bases and uses the same ones as Bob to do the measurement. Nevertheless, without the assistance of the third-party intermediate nodes, Alice cannot infer Bob's measurement results from his own measurements. Moreover, there is no JM attack, because the number of database entries obtained by Alice can be controlled by Trent without being limited to one bit and then no post-processing is required.
Consequently, under the protection of the multi-qubit GHZ state's quantum correlation, Alice and Bob cannot obtain the privacy of each other. The protocol is secure.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

A. DISCUSSION 1) CLASSICAL WIRELESS COMMUNICATION COST
Classical wireless communication cost is the number of the data transmission required in the scheme, which includes all the classical information transmitted by the involved nodes. Therefore, the cost of one query is the product of the number of data and the hop count that the information needs to be transmitted. The total cost is the sum of all the transmissions in the process of query. In our QWNPQ scheme, every node involved in the query except for Trent needs to announce their own measurement bases, which cost one c-bit respectively. In addition, every node except for Alice and Bob(Bob') needs to announce one c-bit measurement results to the destination node Alice respectively, thus the classical wireless communication cost of our scheme is C = 1×(n+1)+1×
, where H i d denote the classical wireless communication hop number from the ith node to the destination node on quantum paths.
2) QUANTUM COMMUNICATION DELAY
The wireless communication and measurements can introduce extra delay in quantum communication, which includes wireless medium access delay, the transmission and propagation delay, node processing delay. The short delay is pursued because of the limited decoherence time in quantum memory and quality of service (QOS) need.
Hypothesize that each measurement delay is D m seconds and each wireless communication delay is D w seconds. VOLUME 7, 2019 In the scheme, the measurement and the classical wireless communication at each node are performed simultaneously. Then the wireless communication delay is the time required from the farthest node to the destination node for one packet transmitted, since when the farthest node sends its classical information, the other related nodes can send theirs simultaneously without any mutual interference. Thus, the total quantum communication delay of our scheme is written as
is the biggest hop number from the farthest node to the destination node Trent when the related nodes announce the information of bases, max H i d r is the biggest hop number from the farthest node to the destination node Alice when the related nodes announce their measurement results.
B. CONCLUSION
We have presented a novel QWNPQ with multiple third parties scheme, which uses a flexible bilayer network topology to ensure the rapid and secure private query. Our protocol inherits the good features as of previous point-to-point schemes, it is loss tolerant and robust against quantum memory attack. In addition, it has the following excellent features. With the help of the third parties, the protocol can determinately control the number of database entries Alice obtains from Bob, and Alice can directly gets the corresponding number of key bits at one time without post-processing. Compared with a single third party, multiple third parties make it more difficult for Alice to guess Bob's measurement results and better protect Bob's privacy. Further, since the number of key bits obtained by Alice can be controlled by the third-party without being limited to one bit and no post-processing is required, thus there is no JM attack. Moreover, under the protection of the multi-qubit GHZ state's quantum correlation, the privacy of Alice and Bob is protected from the third parties' fake entangled attack and external attack, and they cannot obtain the privacy of each other by taking quantum memory attack. The high security of our scheme is fully demonstrated. Our scheme is scalable and can be also used to wired or hybrid quantum networks. For the classical channels, programmable network architecture can be considered.
In the actual implementation of the protocol, the GHZ states generated and distributed by the generator will inevitably be affected by the noise inherent in the channels when transmitted through the quantum wired channels. However, this problem can be addressed by the quantum entanglement distillation method to keep the multi-qubit GHZ state the same as it generated. 
